Hard Choices by Meyers, William H. & Smith, Darnell B.







Follow this and additional works at: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/iowaagreview
Part of the Agricultural and Resource Economics Commons, Agricultural Economics Commons,
Agriculture Law Commons, Economic Policy Commons, and the Public Economics Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Center for Agricultural and Rural Development at Iowa State University Digital
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Iowa Ag Review by an authorized editor of Iowa State University Digital Repository. For more
information, please contact digirep@iastate.edu.
Recommended Citation
Meyers, William H. and Smith, Darnell B. (2015) "Hard Choices," Iowa Ag Review: Vol. 1 : Iss. 3 , Article 7.
Available at: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/iowaagreview/vol1/iss3/7
were currently involved in the specialty soybean 
market, if they were interested in becoming involved, 
and where they thought the industry would be by the 
year 2000. 
We received an enthusiastic response, in part because 
all the respondents expected continued strong gains in 
the share of soybeans sent into specialty markets. (The 
average participant predicted that 20 percent of all 
soybean sales would be identity preserved by the year 
2000.) 
We then sent out a much more detailed survey asking 
those companies already in the specialty business to 
document their involvement in each of the specialty 
markets we had identified. This information has been 
published in a 128-page specialty soybean directory. 
Call Dermot Hayes, CARD, at 515/294-6185, or Greg 
Ehm, lSPB, at 5151223-1423, to inquire about receiving 
a free copy. 
Whe.re Do We Go [rom Here? 
While creating the specialty soybean directory we 
discovered that the specially soybean business is 
already important and is grov.Ting rapidly. As the 
marketing system undergoes the transformation from a 
commodity-based system lO a system that competes on 
characteristics, the Iowa soybean sector will be able to 
offer new customers exactly those characteristics they 
want. Our sense is that Iowa is at the forefront of the 
transition, and that Iowans will receive much of the 
reward. 
Many of the new customers for lowa's specialty 
soybeans and com will locate near the source of 
production. These companies will employ geneticists, 
molecular biologists, and engineers to create products 
that we cannot begin to describe today. With some 
luck and continued managerial attention, the state 
could become home to an industry that will create as 
many uses for corn and soybeans as the computer 
industry h as for the silicone chip. 
Emerging Issues 
Hard Choices 
(William H. Meyers, 5151294-1184) 
(Dantell B. Smith, 5151294-1184) 
As we go to press, both the Senate and House are 
acting on proposals to put the federal budget on a patl1 
to be balanced by 2002. The budget cuts proposed by 
both bodies are substantial but those proposed by the 
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House are larger, s ince the Senate has rejected t1le tax 
cuts adopted by the House. Although the budget 
debates in the House and Senate and between the 
House and Senate are far from over, the expectation is 
that the Agriculture Commiuees will be asked to 
reduce farm program spending by $1.5 billion to $2 
billion per year over the next seven years. 
Spending caps are also being considered. Although it 
is not clear whether creclit would be granted for years 
in which acwal expenditures are below projections, 
Congressional focus is now on constraining actual 
expenditures in any given year as well as on changes in 
total expenditures over the budget period. 
As the budget amounts and rules are being resolved, 
debate will focus on altemative ways of changing 
programs to reduce farm program spending and 
possibly to reduce the year-to-year variability of 
spending. These will be hard choices, as cuts of this 
magnitude are difficult to achieve without reducing 
farm income. Moreover, the different ways to achieve 
the proposed reductions involve a broad range of 
distributional impacts by commodity, region, and type 
of farm. 
Budget Cut Options 
As of this writing, FAPRl has not yet analyzed specific 
options to achieve a particular budget target. However, 
studies that have been done can be used to gain some 
insight into likely impacts. The cost and net fann 
income impacts of several options are summarized and 
compared below: 
1. 25 percent Flex. Increasing flex acres reduces 
payment acres and reduces participant rewrns and 
participation rates, while giving fanners more flexibil-
ity in using base acres for other crops. An analysis of 
increasing flex acres from the current 15 percent to 25 
percent estimates a budget savings of $1.28 billion per 
year and a net farm income loss of $1.1 billion per year 
(FAPRl Report 3-95). This implies that net farm 
income declines $85 for each $100 or budget savings. 
It also indicates that an increase to 25 percent flex is 
not sufficient to meet current budget targets, so this 
approach would require higher flex rates and/or other 
program cULs. 
2. Elimination of 0-50/85 Program. The 0-50/85 
Program pays farmers 85 percent of deficiency pay-
ments on base area where less than 85 percent of 
permitted plantings are actually planted. For rice, 50 
percent of base acres must be planted to qualify. 
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Elimination of this program is estimated to save $280 
million pe1· year and reduce net farm income by $150 
million per year (FAPRI Report 4-95). This makes a 
very small contribution to budget savings, but net farm 
income declines only $54 for each $100 of budget 
savings. 
3. Major program reform. FAPRI recently evaluated 
three major alternatives to current programs, aU of 
which, at a minimum, eliminated current target prices, 
ARPs, and 0-50/85 (see "Three Corners" article in this 
issue) . ln other respects these options are quite 
differelll from each other, but two of them have 
estimated budget savings that are greater than those 
currently being proposed by Congress. These two are 
the No Program scenario and the Revenue Assurance 
scenario. tn these two scenarios, we can roughly 
approximate the impacts or smaller budget cuts by 
giving the "excess budget savings'' back to farmers in 
the form of decoupled cash payments. (Of course, 
Congress could also use some of the "excess budget 
savings'' to restore some of the planned cuts in market 
development, conservation, or research.) 
Budget Cut Impacts 
The followtng assumptions are made ro find these 
approximate impacts. We use a target budget reduc-
tion of $1.6 billion per year and subtract this from the 
estimated budget savings in each of the two scenarios. 
This dillerence constillltes the "excess budget savings" 
that is assumed to be distributed to farmers in the 
same way that transition payments are made in the 
Revenue Assurance scenario. That is , they are paid in 
proportion to the average target and marketing loan 
deficiency payments over the last five years. These 
payments arc assumed to have no impact on produc-
tion decisions, so they change net fann income but do 
not alter the market results of the previous analysis. 
The payments are set in advance, so they lnvolve no 
budget exposure beyond these certain payments. A 
fi ve-year period is used for these approximations, 
though a seven-year ana'lysis would not differ greatly. 
The results are presented in the rable below. 
The No Program scenario is estimated to save $7.54 
billion per year, so $5.94 b illion is available for annual 
decoupled payments. As a result, the adjusted net 
farm income drops by less than $1 billion per year 
compared with current program levels. This implies 
that net farm income would drop about $60 for each 
$100 of budget savings. 
• 
Estimated Impact of $8 Billion Cuts on 
No-Program and Revenue Assurance 
Five-Year Annual 
Total Average 
(billion S) (billion $) 
Assumed Cut i.n Agricult-ure 8.0 1.60 
No-Program Estimates 
FA PRJ estimate of No 
Program Savings 37.7 7.54 
Surplus for dccoupled 
payments J9-
- .I 5.94 
FAPRI estimate of 
No-Program NFl 182.9 36.58 
Added decoupled payments 29.7 5.94 
Adjusted No Program NFI 212.6 4 ') - ') 
-·'-
Change from Baseline -4.8 -0.96 
Revenue Assurance Estimates 
FAPRl estimate of Revenue 
Assurance savings 15.0 3.00 
Surplus for decoupled 
payments 7.0 1.40 
FAPRl estimate of Revenue 
Assurance Nfl 203.1 40.61 
Added decoupled payments 7.0 1.40 
Ad justed Revenue 
• 
Assurance NFI 210.1 42.01 
Increase in government-
financed indemnities 2.3 0.47 
Estimated value of 
increased insurance* 4.7 0.93 
Adjusted NFI plus increased 
insurance value 214.7 42.94 
Change from Baseline -2.7 -0.54 
Baseline Estimate 
FAPRl estimate of 
current program NFI 217.4 43.48 
*Tom! amounts derived from "Risky J3usiness" 
averages, pg. 8. 
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The Revenue Assurance scenario is estimated LO save 
$3 billion per year, after accounting for tl1e increased 
government contribution of $0.47 billion per year to 
replace the current crop insurance with revenue 
assurance. This leaves $1.4 billion available for annual 
decoupled payments, in addition to transition pay-
ments alread)' included in the program design. The 
adjus ted net farm income drops by $1.4 7 biUion. 
However, this scenario differs from the others in that 
an average arumal increase of nearly $.5 billion in 
government financed insurance indemnities also can 
be expected. This difference in cash flow by itself 
would reduce the farm income decline to about $1 
billion or $60 for each $100 of budget savings. The 
"Risky Business" article in this issue indicates that the 
value of government financed insurance in terms of 
reducing cash flow risk has been estimated at two 
times the indemnities payments. Using this factor, net 
farm income plus the value of insurance drops by $.54 
billion per year compared with currenL program levels. 
This measure of farm sector well-being, therefore, [ails 
by about $34 fo r each $100 of budget savings. 
The main reason that the adjusted No Program and 
adjusted Revenue Assurance scenalios indicate a 
smaller income loss per dollar of budget savings 
compared with increasing llex acres is thatt·hese 
scenarios remove more of the currenL prograni con-
straints , and farming efficiency increases. We have 
assumed that the decoupled payments are disuibuted 
exactly like recent deficiency payments, so as to retain: 
the benefit distribution of currenL p rograms. However, 
Congress could decide to target these payments in 
another way. As long as they would remain decoupled 
from production decisions, the principal impact would 
be on the distribution of income rather than on the 
level of income in agriculture. 
The few options presented here are limited because we 
have not yet done analyses for specific levels of budget 
savings. However, these scenarios provide some 
indication of how the impacts can differ under differ-
em methods of achieving budget savings. 
Weather Uncertainty and Financial Risk 
(Darnell B. Smit/1, 5151294-1184) 
lt could well be that for many agricultural producers in 
the United States, the fin ancial risk due to unusual 
weather conditions is greater today than at any lime in 
the recent pasL The LWO primary reasons are: (1) 
increasing budgetary pressure in Washington, imply-
ing that less support for ag!iculture will b e forthcom-
ing in future years, and (2) Last year's federal crop 
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insurance reform, replacing agricultural disaster 
assistance with low-cost catastrophic (CAT) coverage, 
offers only minimal risk reduction, at best. 
Od1er articles in this issue have highlighted the 
expectation of reduced payments lO producers as, even 
without budget cuts, baseline projections already 
incorporate future payment decl ines. It, therefore, 
taxes the imagination to envision that over the me-
dium term, future support to agriculture will, on 
average, be anything but less than current levels. 
Effects of CAT 
Although CAT replaced disaster assistance, the 
coverage level is, at most, 30 percent of expected 
revenue (50 percent of yield times 60 percent of price) 
and even then, half the crop mtiSl be lost before any 
indemnities are paid at all. This means that for 
midrange losses, the losses most likely to occur, 
producers who did not choose to buy increased 
coverage will receive no indemnities whatsoever from 
CAT. For example, suppose an Iowa corn producer 
ex1)ects 150 bushels per acre a t a price of $2.40 per 
bushel. This producer could lose up to 75 bushels per 
ac; re and not be eligible. for any indemnities at all. 
With the 50 percent yield deductible, the yield must 
drop below 75 bushels before coverage kicks in. For 
each bushel lost past the 50 percent deductible, 
however, the producer receives payment a t 60 percent 
of expected price ($2.40 x .6 = $1.44 per bushel). So, 
in this example, if the producer harvests 70 busl1els 
per acre, the covered losses are $7.20 per acre (5 
bushels at a rate of $1.44). For every 100 acres, this 
producer receives $720 ln insurance and $16,800 in 
markeueceipts for a total of $17,520. The $720 
payment covers only 3.75 percent o.f the $19,200 in 
lost market revenue .. 
A comparison with the proposed Revenue Assurance 
program may p rove useful in illustrating differences in 
risk exposure. lf we assume that realized market price 
is equal to the expected price, $2.40, then the per acre 
assured revenue for the above example equals . 70 
times 150 rimes $2.40, or $252 per acre. In our 
example, actual market revenue is $168 per acre, with 
the covered indemnities equaling $84 per acre with 
total receipts of $25,200 for each 100 acres planted. 
Thus, this coverage provides producers with an 
assmed cash flow large enough to cover variable cost 
and some proportion of other costs and expenditures. 
And in si tuatiolls of midrange losses, the kind most 
likely to occur, Revenue Assurance offers a much 
greater degree of cash llow Iisk reduction than the 
CAT. 
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